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H U M A N  R I G H T S  &  H U M A N  W E L F A R E
Cosmopolitan Law—and Cruelty— 
on Trial 
By Matthew S. Weinert 
Law against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials by David Hirsh. 
London: Cavendish/Glasshouse, 2003. 183pp. 
When evil-doing comes like falling rain, nobody calls out ‘stop!’ 
When crimes begin to pile up they become invisible. When sufferings become unendurable the cries are no 
longer heard. The cries, too, fall like rain in the summer. 
—Bertolt Brecht, “When Evil-Doing Comes Like Falling Rain” 
Provocatively, David Hirsh avers that “the appeal to human rights” in a world of war, violence, 
and protracted conflict is “a sign of absolute desperation” (11). The skeptic surely concurs, 
dismissing talk of rights and cosmopolitanism in the face of cruel and pernicious policies and 
activities, believing there to be few available resources to contend with suffering and those who 
perpetrate suffering. Yet Hirsh’s Law against Genocide: Cosmopolitan Trials is a good antidote to 
this sort of nihilism. “The logic of cosmopolitan law,” he maintains, “is to tie the idea of universal 
human rights to a legal structure that can give those rights some concrete reality independently of 
the state…[C]osmopolitan law is one strategy that aims to give the appeal to human rights some 
muscle” (11). Refreshingly, Hirsh does not evoke a misguided and misplaced utopianism, but 
portrays such law in its actuality as it develops and accommodates the demands for justice in a world 
beset by violence and cruelty. 
Hirsh’s purpose is respectfully judicious: “that it is possible for cosmopolitan criminal law to 
operate effectively at least in some instances.” If he can successfully demonstrate this, then 
opposition to such law must perforce “focus more sharply… [on] the actual functioning of the legal 
system” and not be confined to critiquing the law’s ideality (xiii). His conclusions are appreciably 
broad: that “in cosmopolitan criminal law it is possible for universal values to find a worldly 
existence that is not wholly subverted by power and interest” (155). Moreover, such law, because it 
“has such severe safeguards built in…produces, as a by-product, its distinctive form of authoritative 
narrative” (147) and helps forge what he calls a “cosmopolitan social memory” (159). The 
cosmopolitan legal process “is like a machine whose data is input in a form heavily coloured by 
national myth, yet whose output aims to be free from national particularity” (xix). In the end, such 
trials “aim to produce authoritative narratives of the crimes” that in some significant sense become 
“part of the process of the evolution of a global collective memory that can play a role in 
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undermining myths of nationhood, particularly those that have played their part in causing ethnic 
cleansing and genocide”(xix). 
Since Hirsh’s aim is relatively narrow—that is, buttressed by the facts—he succeeds in 
demonstrating cosmopolitan criminal law’s efficacy in some instances. Hirsh uses four trials1 to 
reveal that cosmopolitan criminal law, defined as “the emerging body of law that aims to protect the 
human rights of individuals and groups” (xv), is emphatically not a “sequel to modernity but rather 
an element deeply embedded within it. It is also a characteristically modern form, based on the 
extension of the project of the universalisation of right” (22). Here, he argues against utopian critics 
for whom the existence of such law portends the demise of the state. Offering a sobering dose of 
reality, Hirsh takes little interest in verbiage: we may proclaim all the rights we want, but such 
proclamations and promulgations, while laudable, do little by themselves to transform the predatory 
ways of states at home and abroad and protect the human person from cruelty.  
Rather, Hirsh finds solace in the real work represented by the four trials that are his focus here, 
as well as Nuremberg; the Eichmann trial; the International Criminal Tribunals for the former 
Yugoslavia and Rwanda (ICTY, ICTR); the Pinochet and Habré cases; the trial of Slobodan Milosevic; 
the tribunals for crimes committed in East Timor and Sierra Leone; formation of the International 
Criminal Court and, very recently, the tribunal for Iraq (although these last two have yet to hear 
cases) (Simons 2003). Advances may be limited triumphs hedged by atrocities in various parts of the 
world. But in the mundane (i.e., that cosmopolitan criminal law owes its existence to great powers), 
Hirsh reads the extraordinary—the incremental transformation of international relations by “the 
authority and due process of law” (159). The transformation may be to the casual observer almost 
imperceptible. But for Hirsh, cosmopolitan criminal law trials both expand the envelope of universal 
jurisdiction and human rights enforcement, and seriously challenge “the idea that community must 
necessarily be defined in an exclusive way” (22). Such trials are evidence not of a utopian scheme of 
emerging world government, but of cosmopolitan criminal law’s actuality “outside UN libraries and 
international law journals” (xiv).  
For Hirsh, cosmopolitan criminal law does not develop at the expense of national sovereignty or 
international law (nor does it supplant it)—it emerges and evolves alongside states and domestic and 
international legal systems. He explicitly counters what he calls the strong universalist arguments 
advanced by David Held (2002) and Mary Kaldor (1999) in whose versions of cosmopolitanism 
Hirsh reads “historical narrative[s] of progress” that arise “after and as a result of the increasing 
perception of the deficiencies of the old order” (21). Rather, cosmopolitan criminal law stems from 
the “urgent and actual struggle to find methods of fighting against totalitarianism which do not 
replicate that which is being fought against” (xv). Hirsh ties his story to the real work of real 
individuals who sometimes act and sometimes do not act in the face of cruelty. Cosmopolitan 
criminal law, he reminds the reader, is an existent reality and not a fantastical assertion of 
utopianism. Pointedly, he adds, once supported by great powers, such law assumes a life 
independent of such power (xii-xv, xx, 1, 16, 20ff, 38, 56, 57, 70, 75f, 78, 96, 141, 149f, 152f, 155, 
and 159). But what he fails to explore in any sufficient depth is why and under what circumstances 
1 These are: the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) trials of Blaskic and Tadic (chapter 
five), the London trials of Andrei Sawoniuk in 1999 for crimes committed during the Holocaust (chapter six), and the 
2000 Irving v. Lipstadt libel case for Holocaust denial (chapter seven). 
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cosmopolitan criminal law succeeds. Under what conditions have great power interests permitted 
the establishment of an international tribunal? Why Sierra Leone, but not (to this date) Cambodia? 
Emphasis, he argues, ought not be placed on “the cleavage between the universalist values of 
cosmopolitanism and the politics of more particularist identities…as a product specifically of the 
postmodern ‘now’, which supplants previous political cleavages” (21). More appropriately, Hirsh 
depicts cosmopolitanism “as a thread” running through history alongside states and their nationalist 
aspirations. To wit,  
Immanuel Kant did not develop his theory of cosmopolitan law after and as a result of the generalization of 
absolute state sovereignty. The Genocide Convention (1948) was passed simultaneously with the foundation 
of the UN as a conference of independent states. The Nuremberg trials did not take place as a response to the 
failures of Israeli nationalism or against its interests or sensibilities. The tribunals for Rwanda and 
Yugoslavia did not come into existence because the Security Council was no longer a principle worth 
defending. Many of the events that we understand as landmarks in the development of cosmopolitan law took 
place within, and not in opposition to, the existing order of power and law. Part of what is at stake, therefore, 
in the argument for the recognition of cosmopolitan law, is the degree to which its principles and institutions 
are able to be brought to life as independent entities. Can they attain sufficient authority, independence and 
power to threaten some of the interests that brought them into being? If they can, cosmopolitan law attains an 
existence not just as a set of ideas but as a new form of law (21). 
Yet Hirsh, I think, constructs his critique of Held and Kaldor around a false dichotomy between 
what he thinks is their theory of progress sans agency and his theory of agency. If the former 
manifests a teleological world-view that disposes in some significant sense with human agency—
history is, after all, largely predetermined—then the latter situates a motivated, willful agent divorced 
from a problematic evolutionism at the center of history. What has come to pass and what will come 
to be are matters of circumstance and choice, not, as he indicts Held, the results of fate or “utopian 
yearnings” (16). Yet do not utopian yearnings constitute some contexts of choice? Do not utopian 
proposals yield narratives of potentiality, and thus constitute in significant senses plausible measures 
of reform and eventual actuality? Certainly, Hirsh may be guilty of utopian yearnings himself in that 
he concludes such trials to be moral narratives that constitute a cosmopolitan social memory, a point 
to which I shall return later. 
Held and Kaldor do not so much tie their projects to a preordained conception of history (as 
Hirsh claims they do) in order to sustain their arguments about the emergence of cosmopolitan law. 
Rather, Held argues, the development of such law is intimately bound up with conscious decisions 
of policy makers, state leaders, and ordinary people, and may be charted “from the model of classical 
sovereignty, through a model of liberal international sovereignty, in which the liberal concern for 
limited government is extended into the international sphere, to the model of cosmopolitan 
sovereignty, the law of peoples” as defending a basic set of human rights (5). Hirsh’s argument 
against Kaldor is considerably weaker. In a trans-historical narrative similar to Held’s, Kaldor 
focuses on the changing nature of warfare (the work of real agents and not some invisible hand of 
history), and argues that “war is no longer controlled by sovereign states wielding legitimate 
monopolies of violence” (a bit of an overstatement to be sure). Rather, war “is fought out between 
ethnically defined social formations that mix the characteristics of nationalist struggles, organized 
crime and local warlord-based power” (Kaldor 1999: 5f). As a result of this breakdown in the 
traditional conception of warfare, “the distinction between human rights law and humanitarian law is 
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becoming meaningless” (ibid.) Therefore, she concludes, scholars, lawyers, and policy makers must 
recognize the emergence of a form of law distinct from traditional international law that has at the 
forefront the dignity of human life. Neither Held nor Kaldor disposes of the willing agent as Hirsh 
suggests; each situates that agent and, moreover, cosmopolitan law, in real contexts of struggle, trial 
and error, and considerable human loss. Dramatic acts of “unsociability,” to put it in a rough 
Kantian idiom, do awaken human urges toward compassion and sociality, or at the very least to the 
propensity to put cruelty at the forefront of our moral considerations. 
 
The conclusions Hirsh draws from his examinations, made infinitely more interesting by the fact 
he attended the Sawoniuk and Irving trials, reveal his own “utopian yearnings”—the same sort of 
yearnings for which he criticized Held. He neatly summarizes them on the last page, which I recount 
here. 
Against those who argue that international relations are only determined by power, I have argued that 
processes of decision making that rely on the authority and due process of law can also have an influence. 
Against those who argue that the only legitimate sovereign is the national state, I have argued that crimes 
against humanity have been recognized as the business of all human beings and therefore global institutions 
may develop that have jurisdiction within all states to prosecute such crimes. Against those who argue that 
individual responsibility for these crimes is just a legal fiction, I have argued that those who perpetrate crimes 
against humanity have had alternatives and that, while their alternatives may have been severely constrained, 
they still made free choices. Against those who argue that cosmopolitan law is utopian, I have shown that in 
the ICTY and the ICTR, as well as in national courts, it is coming into being. Against those who argue that 
the practical difficulties of organizing fair trials for such crimes are insurmountable, I have presented evidence 
that fair trails are indeed being held. Against those who argue that cosmopolitanism cannot hope to pull 
people away from their own sacred myths of nationhood, I have shown one mechanism by which a 
cosmopolitan social memory is being forged (159). 
Some of his points are relatively unproblematic. Law does have considerable, enduring influence 
in international relations. Non-traditional practices, especially holding individuals accountable for 
crimes commissioned by states, have emerged post-1945 (chapters one, two, and three).2 Such trials 
have succeeded in meting out justice (chapters four and five)—despite institutional, financial, and 
bureaucratic shortcomings. For example, though the ICTY was “established without the resources 
or the power necessary to succeed in bringing to justice those primarily responsible for ethnic 
cleansing,” it matured, owing to a combination of factors including “the work and vision of the 
prosecutors and judges,” into a viable institution of cosmopolitan justice (75). But, some of his 
conclusions warrant closer inspection, in particular his comments on narrative and cosmopolitan 
social memory (chapters seven and eight), which perforate and deconstruct nationalist myths and 
chauvinisms. 
2 Recall, though, that Peter von Hagenbach, governor of the German town of Breisach, was tried for excessive cruelty to 
citizens and foreigners in 1474 by an ad hoc tribunal comprised of judges from 28 states.  
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An unequivocal vein of Arendtian “storytelling” runs through Hirsh’s work. Arendt, borrowing 
from Shakespeare’s The Tempest to eulogize her friend Walter Benjamin, invoked the metaphor of 
pearl diving to communicate that profound connection between the past and the decaying present 
for benefit of the future. 
And this [poetic] thinking, fed by the present, works with the ‘thought fragments’ it can wrest from the past 
and gather about itself. Like a pearl diver who descends to the bottom of the sea, not to excavate the bottom 
and bring it to light but to pry loose the rich and the strange, the pearls and the coral in the depths and to 
carry them to the surface, this thinking delves into the depths of the past—but not in order to resuscitate it the 
way it was and to contribute to the renewal of extinct ages. What guides this thinking is the conviction that 
although the living is subject to the ruin of time, the process of decay is at the same time a process of 
crystallization, that in the depth of the sea, into which sinks and is dissolved what once was alive, some things 
‘suffer a sea-change’ and survive in new crystallized forms and shapes that remain immune to the elements, as 
though they waited only for the pearl diver who one day will come down to them and bring them up into the 
world of the living—as ‘thought fragments,’ as something ‘rich and strange,’ and perhaps even as everlasting 
Urphänomene (Arendt 1983: 205f). 
Hirsh dives effortlessly into dense trial transcripts and judgments and pries loose “rich and… 
strange” thought fragments from which he weaves his own curious story. These trials, he notes, 
produce “judgments that are, literally, in the form of narratives” (30). They are “self-conscious 
attempt[s] to provide an objective, authoritative and impartial narrative” concerning acts of cruelty 
associated with the breakup of Yugoslavia, ethnic cleansing in Bosnia, and the Holocaust (86). Law, 
being “not outside or above society, even if its own rhetoric requires that it appear to be so...is a 
social practice and…its texts will necessarily bear the imprint of such practice or organizational 
background….[T]he narratives produced by cosmopolitan courts are not, in some absolute sense, 
‘the truth’. But neither, in fact, do they claim to be. They claim to be ‘judgments’” (146).  
This series of claims may be synthesized into two strands of thought or logics. On the one hand, 
Hirsh treats such cases in their immediacy—as global mirrors of their domestic counterparts 
consumed with the quotidian tasks of litigation, including evidentiary procedures, admissibility of 
hearsay and other evidence, contending with media-produced biases, and corroboration of 
testimony, among other things. On the other hand, Hirsh renders a particular reading of such trials 
as deconstructive of national myths (139) and constructive of “cosmopolitan social memory” (159), 
in no small part effectuated by the centrality of judges in the process (91) who produce authoritative, 
narrative-like judgments. As Justice Robert Jackson remarked at Nuremberg, “international law is an 
outgrowth of treaties and agreements between nations and of accepted customs. Yet every custom 
has its origins in some single act…Our own day has the right to institute customs and to conclude 
agreements that will themselves become sources of a newer and strengthened international law.” 
What Justice Jackson failed to point out, Arendt (1977) contends,  
is that, in consequence of this yet unfinished nature of international law, it has become the task of ordinary 
trial judges to render justice without the help of, or beyond the limitation set upon them through, positive, 
posited laws. For the judge, this may be a predicament, and he is only too likely to protest that the ‘single act’ 
demanded of him is not his to perform but is the business of the legislator (273f). 
I don’t think there is any inherent contradiction between the two logics, so long as courts and 
tribunals remain fixed to the purpose at hand: determining individual innocence or guilt vis-à-vis  
specific charges based on corroborated, factual (not hearsay) evidence. Arendt’s primary criticism of 
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the Adolf Eichmann trial, which Hirsh recounts, was not that the trial served in some significant 
sense as a forum for constructing an authoritative narrative of collective memory, but that Israeli 
Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion and chief prosecutor Gideon Hausner placed the entire history of 
anti-Semitism at “the center of the trial. ‘It is not an individual that is in the dock at this historic trial, 
and not the Nazi regime alone,’” Hausner triumphantly proclaimed, “‘but anti-Semitism throughout 
history’…It was bad history and cheap rhetoric; worse, it was clearly at cross-purposes with putting 
Eichmann on trial, suggesting that perhaps he was only an innocent executor of some mysteriously 
foreordained destiny…” (ibid.: 19). Such trials ought not be platforms for the invention and 
propagation of nationalist myth, Arendt intimates and Hirsh proclaims, though they may, as in the 
case of the Balkans, disclose the limits of and ultimately restrain chauvinistic nationalism. 
No doubt, Arendt reveals Hirsh’s disquiet with history as a narrative of progress sans agency. To 
portray cruelty and suffering as systemic is to absolve real agents of responsibility for real crimes. To 
portray Eichmann as an innocent executor of “the oldest crime [Jews] knew and remembered” 
ignores the unprecedented nature of the crime of genocide and crimes against humanity. “Had the 
court in Jerusalem understood that there were distinctions between discrimination, expulsion, and 
genocide,” Arendt contends, “it would have immediately become clear that the supreme crime it was 
confronted with, the physical extermination of the Jewish people, was a crime against 
humanity…and that only the choice of victims, not the nature of the crime, could be derived from 
the long history of Jew-hatred and anti-Semitism” (ibid.: 267, 269). Failure to pass judgment on 
specific individuals for specific acts associated with such monstrous cruelty, therefore, would be a 
travesty of justice and tacit complicity in the crime itself. 
Which brings us to the construction of cosmopolitan social memory and, concomitantly, the 
deconstruction of nationalist myth. The myths to which Hirsh directs his critical gaze are those in 
which one nationality imposes itself on other nationalities because it believes itself to be threatened 
by or superior to those nationalities. Thus, the myth of a “Greater Serbia” was the “only way for 
Serbs [under Milosevic] to avoid…continuing domination” by Muslims (140). Likewise, David 
Irving’s “strange narrative of English and German nationalism, and of the nationalism of the white 
race, was being judged against an academic historiographical narrative—one that the Nazis might 
have called a Jewish cosmopolitan narrative” (145). Arendt highlighted the difficult position in 
which the judge finds him or herself vis-à-vis such myths and the extraordinary crimes to which they 
provide a sordid logic. Confronted as it were with underdeveloped or nonexistent rules and laws to 
deal with the extraordinary, the judge must interpret in novel ways existing laws and invent, in some 
significant sense, judicial responses to egregious, unprecedented crimes. Perhaps this is the real 
reason—discomfort with judicial activism—why the court failed to appreciate the significance of a 
crime against humanity, portraying it instead in light of well-known laws against murder. 
Yet the unprecedented becomes by its nature a precedent for the future, and though no legal 
proceeding or injunction possesses sufficient power and authority to prevent its reappearance, law 
must constantly adapt to changing circumstances and provide remedies for like crimes in the future. 
Both Arendt and Hirsh intimate as much: the failures of the Jerusalem court in Eichmann and the 
British court in Sawoniuk rested with judges and lawyers who refused to (and, as I suggested above, 
could not) acknowledge the unparalleled nature of the crimes under consideration. Each placed the 
crimes in a conventional dialogue of murder. Thus it becomes the work of the sociologist and the 
scholar, among others, to interpret court proceedings and expose their pearls, their wisdom, and 
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make them available to future law-creation and legal proceedings. For “if genocide is an actual 
possibility of the future, then,” Arendt maintains, “no people on earth…can feel reasonably assured 
of its continued existence without the help and the protection of international law” (Ibid., 273). In 
this sense, though cosmopolitan criminal trials deal with individuals and individual acts, the 
cosmopolitan legal process acts “like a machine whose data is input in a form heavily coloured by 
national myth, yet whose output aims to be free from national particularity” in the form of 
“authoritative narratives of the crimes” (xix).  
In turn, these narratives contribute to “the evolution of a global collective memory that can play 
a role in undermining myths of nationhood, particularly those that have played their part in causing 
ethnic cleansing and genocide”(xix). Though courts, whether they be the national courts of Britain 
as with the Sawoniuk and Irving cases, or international tribunals as with the former Yugoslavia and 
Nuremberg, remain committed to the task of hearing testimony and weighing evidence according to 
specific legal norms and rules, Hirsh admits that such courts inevitably, by virtue of the centrality of 
judges in them, “produce a judgment…free of…contradictory nationalist impulses” (143). 
 
The claim of constructing a cosmopolitan social memory strikes me as slightly implausible and 
quite grandiose—but most likely true. Nuremberg, the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda, and the 
like, as particular developments responsive to particular atrocities in particular contexts, inevitably 
enshrine wider lessons constructive of a global history. The work of such institutions develops the 
law and by its nature invites participation in a wider dialogue about the content and nature of such 
acts. 
Still, problems remain. Who are these unnamed cosmopolitans? Academics? Lawyers? Policy-
makers? Do ordinary citizens imbibe the lessons Hirsh thinks we ought to derive from such trials? 
Furthermore, what evidence suggests any preventive role for such trials? Do these trials deter 
potential genocidaires from committing their gross deeds? Collective social memory necessarily plays 
an important role in the generation, interpretation, and retention of a collective past, which suggests 
not only the presence of a collective, but also lessons derivative from such a past. Memory, to put 
the matter colloquially, in part memorializes lessons, whether preventive or prohibitive, and carries 
them into the future. At the moment there is little evidence to suggest that cosmopolitan courts, 
trials, and the cosmopolitan memory they produce have any (deterrent) effect on potential genocidaires 
or other acts of extreme cruelty.3 What pearls, then, do such courts and trials deliver?  
Additionally, what constitutes a cosmopolitan trial? Though Hirsh fails to answer this question 
directly, we can distill four central elements from the arguments presented. First, cosmopolitan 
criminal trials must consider crimes of a universal nature, including crimes against humanity, war 
3 In a recent BBC radio interview, Admiral Sir Michael Boyce, commander of the British forces in the recent war in Iraq, 
revealed that he threatened to resign on the eve of the war unless the Attorney-General gave him an unequivocal 
assurance of the war’s legality. Thus, international criminal law has some deterrent effect. I owe this point to an 
anonymous reviewer. 
 39
7
Weinert: Cosmopolitan Law—and Cruelty— on Trial
Published by Digital Commons @ DU, 2004
V O L U M E  4  – 2 0 0 4
crimes, crimes against the peace, and genocide. Hirsh omits from consideration other crimes of a 
universal nature, including piracy, slave trading, torture, and apartheid, including the notable fact that 
by 1830, four mixed courts of arbitration in Sierra Leone, Havana, Paramaribo and Rio de Janeiro 
were charged with the task of prosecuting slavers (Thomas 1997).  
Second, prosecutors must identify specific individuals who commissioned and/or committed 
such crimes. Such trials thus mirror their domestic counterparts, concerned as it were with individual 
guilt or innocence. Third—and more problematic—tribunals or courts must be available and willing 
to try such individuals—and most often these are national courts. Hirsh uses the example of Britain, 
which failed to try suspects for crimes committed during World War II—despite the prosecutorial 
power available to it under international law. British courts eschewed the concept of universal 
jurisdiction and relied instead on national legislation, specifically the 1991 War Crimes Act which 
granted British courts authority to try suspects for “murder or manslaughter in contravention of the 
laws and customs of war,” but not specifically for crimes against humanity or genocide (96). Indeed, 
Hirsh explicitly notes that most national courts rely not on universal jurisdiction but on more 
concrete domestic legislation that outlaws particular crimes as the basis for obtaining jurisdiction 
over crimes considered in some sense universal in nature. While some may see this as a failing of 
international law, Hirsh interprets national legislative acts as positive assertions that ultimately 
buttress prosecution for “cosmopolitan” crimes.  
Finally, and most controversially, Hirsh suggests that it is the absence of a jury that makes a 
cosmopolitan trial, since a jury is “only able to produce a guilty or not guilty verdict” and not the 
authoritative narrative that he finds appealing (132). Analogous to U.S. Supreme Court decisions, 
which carefully re-present the arguments and evidence and communicate a particular authoritative 
stance on the issue before it, the judgments of such trials feed into a global historical narrative that 
charts the development of cosmopolitan criminal law and attempts to deconstruct, secondarily, 
nationalist myths of greatness that often contributed to the crimes in the first place (138f). 
Now that we have identified what constitutes a cosmopolitan criminal trial, we can begin to 
tackle the problem of their product: a cosmopolitan social narrative and, concomitantly, a 
cosmopolitan social memory. Hirsh never clearly defines his terms, though he comes close by 
equating definition with function: a cosmopolitan narrative is “of the type that can play [its] part in 
undercutting myths of nationhood” (139). But, Hirsh asks, “how can…genocidal and mythical social 
memories be replaced, fought against, or superseded?” (141). Is this even a proper way of framing 
the question? Is this, moreover, utopian yearning?  
Cosmopolitan trials construct a cosmopolitan narrative and memory by establishing “a true 
picture of the events under investigation” (141). However, compare this point with one he makes 
several pages later: “the narratives produced by cosmopolitan courts are not, in some absolute sense, 
‘the truth’. But neither, in fact, do they claim to be. They claim to be ‘judgments’” (146). Is there a 
discrepancy here? How can we equate truth with judgment?  
Trials, he avers, help publicize facts—genocide and rape, torture and expropriations of property, 
annihilations and expulsions—about events (141), the effects of which, he hopes, deter potential 
criminals. Nuremberg publicized the deeds of the Nazis; the ICTY publicizes by entering into 
judgments particular facts about Serbian, Bosnian, and Croat atrocities. To illustrate, the Tadic 
judgment 
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is a long and closely argued document showing how the war started in Bosnia, how the politics of the 
communities evolved, how ethnic cleansing and genocide was possible, how it was carried out, and who was 
responsible. The trial was about more than Tadic. It was about producing a version of the truth of what 
happened; a version that claims authority because it is produced by an impartial cosmopolitan court according 
to the rules, methods, and traditions of international law (141f). 
Compare the following statements, the first by the ICTY justices in the sentencing phase of the 
Erdemovic trial, the second by ICTR Judge Pillay concerning the Rwandan Akeyasu ruling: 
“[d]iscovering the truth is a cornerstone of the rule of law and a fundamental step on the way to 
reconciliation…for it is truth…that begins the healing process” (Prosecutor v. Drazen Erdemovic, 
para.21). Likewise, “[w]ho interprets the law is at least as important as who makes the law, if not 
more so” (UN, 33). Collective social narratives and memories thus appear not merely as the product 
of reflection and fabrication by academics, sociologists, and the like, but also, in part, by the 
conscious construct of courts. 
But Hirsh’s statement raises crucial questions—ones that defy response. Was Tadic ultimately 
found guilty for individual deeds, or was his alleged guilt predicated on some moral revulsion vis-à-vis 
the entire war, on the accompanying need to do something, anything? Why did the tribunal find it 
necessary to implant in a document—a judgment—on the particular guilt of a particular individual 
for particular deeds a wider historical narrative on the war itself? Has the court stripped Tadic of his 
individuality, finding his guilt not on corroborated evidence but on the basis he acted as some 
‘innocent executor of some mysteriously foreordained history’?  
Courts, especially when they deal with the unprecedented, the extraordinary, the egregious, must 
ascertain the facts and embed them in as impartial an account as possible. As I read Hirsh, he 
intimates that courts dissociated from crimes that occurred in other states—for example, the 
London courts that heard the Sawoniuk and Irving Holocaust trials or the ICTY and ICTR—are 
better equipped at erasing nationalist myths and chauvinisms from judgments than national courts 
hearing crimes that occurred in their countries. This echoes Arendt’s critique of the Jerusalem court: 
she did not object to that court’s jurisdiction. Rather, she objected to Hausner and Ben Gurion’s 
attempt to turn a criminal trial into a mouthpiece for Israeli national myth-making—thus her 
criticisms of them and her praise of the judges for resisting their attempts. If my reading is correct, 
then it might be plausible to argue national courts should immediately recuse themselves from cases 
arising within their territorial jurisdictions, especially those arising from ethnic, nationalist, and/or 
religious conflicts. Such an act would communicate to involved parties and to the world at large a 
serious attempt to diffuse ethnic, religious, and national hatreds by imparting authority to a third 
party to adjudicate disputes arising from such conflicts. Given this interpretation, the International 
Criminal Court might prove a more than appropriate venue to diffuse national particularities and 
chauvinisms and generate a more impartial narrative of events surrounding egregious acts of cruelty.  
If what I write has any element of truth, then cosmopolitan trials and the courts that try such 
cases face portentous responsibilities. Again, as Arendt noted, the Jerusalem court that tried 
Eichmann ignored the significance of the Holocaust as an act of genocide and a crime against 
humanity. But I think Arendt—and Hirsh, for that mater—could have argued further. Courts must 
be attuned to the motives and intentions behind monstrous crimes. The Eichmann court, for 
example, could only interpret heinous crimes against Jews as extensions of anti-Semitism. (In the 
process, it ignored the fact that the same crimes were committed against Poles, the Roma, and 
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“deviants” and disabled of all nationalities under Nazi occupation). In its failure to grasp the import 
of the Holocaust as one of many crimes against humanity committed by the Nazis, the Eichmann 
court also missed a completely novel way of dealing with invented and perceived “otherness” (Hutus 
against Tutsis; ideologically pure Khmer against Westernized, adulterated Cambodians) in 
contradistinction to conventional forms of oppression and racism that are in a significant sense 
reflective of old power politics involving conquest, enslavement, and non-systematic forms of 
annihilation. The final solution to the Jewish question revealed a sinister innovativeness in which a 
body of people was singled out for religious and cultural differences. Such difference was 
exaggerated by dominant national groups—the French, Germans, Poles, Spanish—and, 
consequently, a “separate” (albeit fictitious) race (Semitic peoples) invented. This is much more 
dangerous, I think, than traditional forms of racism because it opens the possibility of targeting any 
group for perceived differences (no matter how minor) and annihilating them (or oppressing them) 
on that basis. 
Arguably, then, these trials, may provide subtle yet real deterrent effects. Practically speaking, 
they provide ordinary means to prosecute those responsible for extraordinary crimes. Further, they 
disaggregate the most egregious crimes from the auspices of state authority and immunity, thereby 
forcing a change in the conduct of international relations: that certain people, no matter their 
standing in state governance and military structures, may and can be held personally accountable for 
cruel and egregious crimes such as genocide and crimes against humanity. Despite the hiatus from 
Nuremberg to the creation of the ICTY, cosmopolitan criminal law fortifies the idea of a set of 
rights available to all simply by virtue of being a member of the species Homo sapiens. 
Cosmopolitan trials and courts do more than simply proclaim such rights. More importantly, they 
put cruelty and suffering at then forefront of moral and legal consideration. They dissect, examine, 
and strike out against rights-defying and rights-denying acts of cruelty and confirm the notion that, 
in some instances, such acts will be met with prosecution and punishment. Perhaps, in the final 
analysis, the real import of cosmopolitan criminal trials and courts lies with institutionalizing 
suspicion of authority structures by generating cosmopolitan social memory. Trial narratives and the 
collective memory into which they crystallize instigate a collective conversation about the nature and 
limits of authority, power and rule. In the end, as Judith Shklar poignantly stated, only a distrustful, 
conversant population, aware of the myriad of rights if the human person, “can be relied on to 
watch out for its rights, to ward off fear, and to be able to make their own projects, whether they be 
modest or great” (Shklar 1984: 238). 
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